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Who Owns the EU Reform Debate?
by Almut Möller
Summary / Zusammenfassung
Countries outside of the euro zone are naturally asking themselves what the immi-
nent deepening of this zone will mean for European Union membership in the 
future. At the same time, the question overarches the debate about EU reform. 
In these overlapping discussions, not every suggestion that comes unbidden is neces-
sarily counterproductive. Quite the contrary.
Dabei sein ist alles
Wer bestimmt die EU-Reformdebatte?
von Almut Möller
Mit der bevorstehenden Vertiefung der Euro-Zone stellt sich die Frage, was die 
Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union künftig noch bedeutet. Sind alle gleich, 
oder manche „gleicher“? Werden die Nicht-Euro-Länder bald überhaupt noch 
als vollwertige EU-Mitglieder angesehen, mit den damit verbundenen Rechten 
und Pflichten, oder verlieren sie langsam aber sicher den Anschluss an die stärker 
integrierte Währungsunion? Um den Charakter, um Sinn und Zweck der EU 
ist ein Kampf  um Deutungshoheit entbrannt. Die Frage, wer die EU-Debatte 
bestimmt, ist deshalb längst nicht so unschuldig ist, wie sie klingt. Letztlich geht 
es um die Machtfrage, um den Zugang zu Entscheidungsprozessen und Ressour-
cen der künftigen EU. Im Vorfeld der Europawahlen im Mai 2014 bringen 
sich die Akteure in Stellung. Nicht jeder Vorschlag aus angeblich „unberufenem 
Munde“ ist dabei kontraproduktiv – im Gegenteil.
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Who Owns the EU Reform Debate?
by Almut Möller
The European Union is in a formative phase, and 
the true meaning of “EU membership” is being 
carried along in its wake. What does it mean today 
to be a member of the EU? Are all members equal, 
or are some in fact “more equal than others”? 
Who gets to decide what a “real” EU member is, 
anyway?
Questions about the meaning of EU identity are 
being posed not only by the members of the euro 
zone—who, in the course of reforming their com-
mon currency area, are confronting entirely new 
problems of shared sovereignty and democratic 
legitimation. The European identity of countries 
outside the euro zone is affected as well. Will 
non-euro countries soon even be considered full 
member states with all the attendant rights and 
responsibilities—or will they slowly but surely lose 
their connection to the more strongly integrated 
monetary union? Will they forfeit their say in the 
decision-making process, which will ultimately 
affect them as participants in the single market?
Against this background, one must ask the funda-
mental question of what defines EU membership 
at its core. Does it mean belonging to the deeper 
monetary union and its decision-making processes? 
Belonging to the single market? Belonging to a 
community of values?
Seeds of discord in the Union 
To pose the question of EU identity may at first 
glance seem an academic and artificial exercise. 
After all, one of the major strengths of the Euro-
pean integration process is that it rarely can—or 
must—provide binding answers about the scope 
and depth of integration. Up until now this open-
ness has made it possible for an “ever closer union” 
to offer room to countries with widely differing 
ambitions. Now, however, the terms and content 
of EU membership are threatening to become 
divisive elements. How did a battle come to flare 
up over something as basic as the interpretation of 
the character of the EU, its meaning and purpose?
In essence, it is the old subject of what the EU is 
supposed to achieve. Most recently, this has con-
densed into a question of whether a more strongly 
integrated euro zone can be reconciled with a 
high-performance Union with its single market 
of 28 members. How much asynchrony can the 
system handle? After all, there is a risk of creating 
systems that will compete with each other, which 
could well challenge the very idea of the single 
market.
It is therefore only to be expected that member 
states are reacting to these possible developments 
and are joining the debate over what the project 
of European unification actually consists of—and 
what sort of Union is to be left standing once the 
clean-up efforts have been completed.
Dry, legalistic, and technical
Governments and other actors are participating 
in this discussion in extremely varied ways. Take 
Germany for example. Chancellor Angela Merkel 
calls it “flying by sight,” that is, taking a step-by-
step approach to reform. This is why the debate 
in Berlin about Europe is largely shaped in a dry, 
legalistic, and technical way—dotted with terms 
like “contractual relationships,” “single resolution 
mechanism,” “stability union,” to name a few of 
the current catchphrases. In the German debate, 
the fact that reforming the euro zone involves not 
only institutional and legal reorganization but also 
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some fundamental economic and social choices 
for the euro countries—to say nothing of the very 
make-up of the Union—tends to stay out of the 
spotlight.
The bloodless federal election campaign that 
recently took place in Germany and the coalition 
negotiations that followed also contributed to this. 
Here, the subject of Europe was buried as a sub-
item on the fiscal policy agenda, which really does 
speak volumes about the new government’s idea of 
Europe.
The coalition government wants it this way. On 
the domestic front—following the line that has 
been pursued with astonishing success up until 
now—the idea is to stir up as little dust as pos-
sible. Hammering out euro zone reforms should 
really take place beneath the radar of public atten-
tion and excitement. On the European level, as a 
decisive member of the euro zone, Berlin is in the 
comfortable position of enjoying great influence 
in the way the reform agenda is designed. In many 
places, one hears of “German dictates,” although 
this is far from undisputed. Nonetheless, according 
to the calculations of the new Merkel government, 
this is an optimal point of departure for forming 
its euro zone 2.0.
Elsewhere, other actors are fighting for the right 
to enter the decider’s club. The debate about 
Europe that has been raging for months in Great 
Britain is so ideologically heated that it is making 
many Europeans on the continent rub their eyes 
in amazement (and not just the high-strung ones). 
In January 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron, 
under growing pressure from his conservative 
party, announced that he wanted to negotiate with 
the EU over the terms of his country’s member-
ship. Spelled out, this means “less Europe.” After 
his party’s desired reelection in 2015, the still-to-be 
reached agreement on membership terms is sup-
posed to help the prime minister win the referen-
dum on Great Britain’s staying in the EU.
Too bad that in order to achieve its much-needed 
process for re-negotiation at the EU level, London 
finds itself in a difficult starting position. Hardly 
any other EU member state has the time or incli-
nation right now to help the British government 
recapture portions of its rampant leadership elite 
or to tame its misdirected public opinion. The 
“balance of competencies review” between the EU 
and Britain that London launched in 2012 may be 
receiving a certain amount of analytical interest in 
other EU capitals—but politically it is seen as a 
stink bomb.
One hears fairly openly in Berlin and Paris now 
that the British have hereby catapulted themselves 
straight out of a serious reform debate that goes 
beyond mere national interest. How is Cameron 
going to manage any sort of opportunity for re-
negotiations—that is, a negotiation process to 
which London can bring its demands? From a con-
tinental perspective, this looks rather hopeless.
“But there is nothing wrong with ambition,” the 
British government said to itself. If British ideas on 
EU reform could only be phrased in slightly more 
palatable terms, they would almost certainly find 
supporters in continental Europe. London entered 
the race of ideas with calls for more competitive-
ness, deregulation, and strengthening national 
parliaments. Can anyone seriously be against such 
suggestions?
Marginalization looks rather 
 different
Agile public diplomats that they are, the British 
have meanwhile managed to spin parts of the con-
tinental reform debate—not just in narrow politi-
cal and diplomatic circles but also in universities 
and think tanks, within key media, and on Twitter. 
Continental Europe may indeed still continue to 
view London skeptically, but Britain has nonethe-
less contrived again to be a player at the table. 
Marginalization actually looks rather different.
Traditionally, Britain considers belonging to the 
single market to be the essential characteristic of 
EU membership. Germany, on the other hand, 
positions itself differently, making the euro its 
point of reference. After all, Berlin argues, Brit-
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ain, Denmark, and Sweden (in a limited way) are 
mere exceptions; all new EU member states have 
committed to joining the euro zone as soon as 
they have fulfilled the convergence criteria. While 
this may be true in terms of fact—and while it is 
understandable that the German government has 
no desire to see a wedge driven into the EU—mat-
ters are far more complicated from a political point 
of view. Latvia did in fact just adopt the euro at 
the start of the year, and the euro zone is indeed 
growing. But the question remains open of how 
long it will take before the euro zone becomes 
nearly identical with the number of EU countries. 
In the meantime, it may well cost the German gov-
ernment considerable effort to uphold the euro as 
the main hallmark of EU membership.
Alarm bells are ringing in Warsaw
When this topic comes up, the loudest alarm bells 
are the ones ringing in Warsaw. Ten years into its 
accession, Poland has become an accepted mem-
ber of the EU leadership circle. Nonetheless it 
is not yet a member of the euro zone. Warsaw is 
therefore watching the evolving meaning of “EU 
membership” with particular interest—and doing 
its best to shape the outcome.
In contrast to Britain, Poland enjoys comparatively 
good preliminary conditions for influencing the 
terms of EU reform. History has helped it forge 
especially strong relations with Germany, with 
whom it has come to be on an equal footing as an 
interlocutor. Moreover, in the Weimar Triangle—
the cooperative association of Poland, France, and 
Germany established over twenty years ago—it 
stands side-by-side with Paris. From a political-
strategic perspective, Warsaw is indeed well placed 
vis-à-vis the dual engine that drives the euro zone.
All the same, Poland has to worry about the dif-
ficulty of keeping up its connection with the 
deepened monetary union economically and insti-
tutionally, even if it has adopted the new reform 
treaties. In a speech he gave in Berlin in Novem-
ber 2011, the Polish foreign minister, Radosław 
Sikorski, took an effective and memorable stand in 
the debate about the future, warning the German 
government that he feared “German inactivity” far 
more than he feared German power. The speech 
has had staying power, but Warsaw must continue 
to work hard to remain at the center of action. It is 
for this reason, among other things, that Poland is 
building up its cooperation with France in security 
and defense policy. The logic here is that if it does 
not become a member of the euro zone it will at 
least be a partner of some weight in one of the 
EU’s other substantial policy areas.
Meanwhile Warsaw has largely managed to avoid 
London’s attempts to cuddle up; on the contrary, 
Sikorski seemed far keener to read the UK the riot 
act in his September 2012 speech at Blenheim Pal-
ace. Determined as it is to remain part of the “cen-
ter,” it would indeed be extremely unwise for War-
saw to raise doubts in Berlin and London about its 
European orientation.
These examples from Germany, Britain, and 
Poland show clearly enough that the question of 
who owns the EU debate is by no means of an 
innocent nature. Ultimately, it involves the power 
question: access to the decision-making processes 
and resources of the future EU.
In the meantime, not only governments but also 
parties (gearing up for the 2014 European elec-
tions), associations, and actors from organized civil 
society have started to bring far greater weight to 
the debate on EU reform. In doing so they are 
attempting to lay claim to the “new” EU debate 
and to shape it according to their own interests—
in some cases with considerable financial resources 
at their disposal. Compared to earlier EU reforms, 
the number of actors and arenas in the current 
debate is multiplying.
Who is allowed to join the 
 conversation?
These developments are strengthened by the politi-
cization of Europe policies in recent years. To put 
it simply: when Angela Merkel sets forth in a black 
limousine to meet her counterparts at the Rond-
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point Schuman, she travels not as the head of an 
important EU member state but rather as a politi-
cian needing to organize political backing of the 
coalition and her electorate at home. In the wake 
of the euro crisis, knowledge about and attention 
to the arrangements being made around the EU’s 
negotiating tables has grown enormously.
This is without doubt a welcome development in 
terms of the democratization of European policy. 
Today’s Europe has more varied information on 
offer than ever before, a wealth of opinions about 
the EU, its politicians, and the ongoing reforms. 
Public opinion therefore plays a much greater role 
in the calculations of various actors. “Europe mat-
ters”—now even in terms of holding on to power 
at home.
In the meantime, public opinion is being mobi-
lized all over Europe. One thinks of the debates 
taking place throughout Europe and well beyond 
on the subject “austerity versus growth” which 
caused considerable headwind in Brussels for 
the German government. Connected to this new 
dynamic in the debate over reform is also the ques-
tion of who the legitimate participants are—and 
why—as well as, vice versa, which actors are lack-
ing (or seem to be lacking) legitimacy for partici-
pating in the debate over reforming the EU.
In many places, one hears it said that the British 
lack a constructive interest in developing a reform 
agenda for the EU beyond national self-interest. 
Is that really the case? Naturally, much depends 
on what sort of EU one has in mind. London, for 
example, openly expresses its doubts about the 
founding treaty’s goal of creating an “ever closer 
union” among the peoples of Europe. To those 
who see this aim as the very heart, the guiding 
principle, of the Union, this comes as a shock.
Until just a short time ago, such champions of 
the old European idea were in the overwhelm-
ing majority in continental Europe. Today it is 
no longer a given that governments and, above 
all, national populations mutually embrace this 
goal. This does not necessarily make them all into 
enemies of the EU. Even if Cameron is, crucially, 
plumping for his own reelection, this does not 
make the questions London is putting on the table 
any less relevant. For surely in the end, we do not 
all have to share the same opinion. What the EU 
cannot afford at the moment, however, is a lack of 
ideas. Anyone ignoring a deep and controversial 
debate over reforms is not going to help Europe 
get out of its crisis. Quite the contrary: it only 
makes ample room for the growing discomfort 
that many people feel about the benefits of mem-
bership and the future direction of the EU.
Expect Shockwaves
This discomfort is particularly relevant when con-
sidered against the background of the upcoming 
European elections this May 2014. Populist and 
extremist parties and movements have been gain-
ing ground throughout Europe for many years. To 
lump them all together would be dishonest, but 
what many of them have in common is that they 
radically question the “EU model” and its underly-
ing values.
Often they present themselves as the sole uphold-
ers of genuine alternatives and try to hijack the 
reform debate for themselves. Even though they 
seldom pull together, they could very well send 
shockwaves through the European capitals at the 
polls this May. One need only think of Marine Le 
Pen, who wants to make her Front National into 
the strongest power in the upcoming municipal 
elections in France and who attempts to pres-
ent herself as a unified right-wing force for the 
European elections with the Dutch far-right leader 
Geert Wilders.
Now more than ever, reform-oriented forces who 
want a better EU must make very clear where the 
difference lies between visions of “a different EU” 
and a declaration of war on its fundamental values 
and goals. Too much ground has already been lost.
The best argument for mobilizing the citizens of 
Germany and other countries to take part in the 
European elections is to show them that right 
now it is a matter of choosing course for the EU; 
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that there is an entire bandwidth of legitimate and 
interesting alternatives to consider in the current 
debate over the future direction of the EU; and 
that arguments about them need to take place and 
need to be heard.
The fact is, however, that there is also a growing 
number of forces that claim they want a “different 
Europe” but in reality have no interest in the spirit 
of cooperation and an interwoven Europe.
Almut Möller heads the Alfred von Oppenheim 
Center for European Policy Studies at the DGAP; 
Translation: Miranda Robbins. 
This article first appeared in the January/February 
2014 edition of Internationale Politik.
